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Abstract: This research examines the economic consequences of fair value accounting 
and a change in the distribution rule. In Japan, fair value accounting for financial 
instruments was mandated from 2001, and unrealized revaluation profits were to be 
included in income statements. As an institutional correspondence to the change in 
accounting standards, Japanese Commerce Law implemented the  deduction  of 
revaluation profits from distributable profits. However, from  2006, the Japanese 
Company Act  changed its distribution rule to include revaluation profits in 
distributable profits. 
   Utilizing such a unique institutional setting, I investigated whether fair value 
adjustments are related to dividends and whether the change in the distribution rule 
had an impact on companies’ dividend policies. The results show that the change in 
the distribution rule influenced  companies’ dividend policies, especially Japanese 
firms, as they tend to pay out revaluation profits as allowed by the Company Act.   
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Economic Consequences of Fair Value Accounting and 
a Change in the Distribution Rule 
1   Introduction 
This research examines the economic consequences of fair value accounting and a 
change in the distribution rule in Japan. This topic is of interest for the following 
three reasons. 
First, fair value accounting is becoming increasingly important in accounting 
standards, driven by the convergence toward or adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (hereafter, IFRS) all over the world. Regulators suggest that 
fair values lead to improved financial reporting, because fair value numbers are more 
timely and  reliable, and thus facilitate  a decision mechanism (e.g., Financial 
Accounting Standard Board/International Accounting Standard Board, 2005). 
However, as pointed out in Brüggemann et al.[2010], IFRS adoption is likely to have 
“unintended” consequences in many aspects, and we have few empirical evidences of 
the consequences of fair value accounting or IFRS adoption, especially in terms of 
dividend policy and distribution rule. 
Second, some studies argue that fair value accounting may weaken creditor 
protection which is achieved through the distribution rule of the Company Act (e.g., 
High Level Group of Company Law Experts, 2002; Pellens and Sellhorn, 2006; 
Rickford, 2004; 2006, etc.). In the EU, the second Company Law Directive’s “balance 
sheet test” restricts the maximum amount of distributable profits based on a firm’s 
balance sheet (specifically, accumulated accounting earnings). This type of 
distribution rule is tied strictly to the legal capital system. According to Pellens and 
Sellhorn [2006], the  critics against capital maintenance based on IFRS financial 
statements are concerned that fair value accounting will lead to the distribution of 
“unrealized” profits, which increases  the riskiness of firms’ assets. However, the 3 
 
relationship between fair value accounting and the distribution rule has not been 
examined empirically. Thus, I believe that examining the consequences of fair value 
accounting in terms of dividend policy and the distribution rule is necessary for the 
arguments about institutional designing. 
Third, few empirical studies exist on the consequences of fair value accounting in 
terms of dividends and the distribution rule. As noted above, although fair value 
accounting is becoming increasingly important and its influence on the distribution 
rule is becoming an institutional matter, few empirical studies exist on the topic. In 
particular, in the EU, although arguments about reforming the legal capital system 
in the Company Act exist, there is insufficient empirical evidence on the relationship 
between fair value accounting and the legal capital system. 
   The main questions that  this research attempts to answer are whether 
revaluation profits and losses from fair value accounting are paid out as dividends in 
Japan, and whether a change in the distribution rule influences companies’ dividend 
policies. If a company pays out revaluation profits as dividends, this means that the 
company’s assets on the balance sheet become riskier in terms of creditor protection 
of the legal capital system. Therefore, from the perspective of institutional designing, 
whether revaluation profits and losses from fair value accounting are paid out as 
dividends is an important question. In addition,  the  distribution rule  in Japan 
changed the treatment of revaluation profits for trading securities, and this 
institutional change provides a unique opportunity to examine its economic 
consequence. 
   I assess the impact  of revaluation profits and losses on dividends using the 
framework of Lintner [1956], which is used in Goncharov and van Triest [2011] as 
well. The Lintner framework formalizes the link between dividends and earnings 
components, and states that companies tend to prefer a stable dividend development 4 
 
in relation to earnings. Namely, if managers recognize revaluation profits and losses 
as transitory components of earnings, revaluation profits and losses are not 
distribution-relevant, thus, no relationship should exist between revaluation profits 
and losses and dividends. In addition, if there is a  positive relationship between 
revaluation profits and dividends, this could indicate that companies may pay out 
transitory “unrealized” profits as dividends, and could imply that companies’ assets 
are becoming riskier in the context of creditor protection of the legal capital system.   
   I examined the impact of revaluation profits and losses on dividends in a sample 
of over 25,000 firm-year observations of Japanese listed companies during the period 
2002−2008. In Japan, fair value accounting for financial instruments was mandated 
from April 2001, and a portion of fair value adjustments  is  included in income 
statements. As an institutional correspondence to the change in  accounting 
standards, Japanese Commerce Law decided to exclude  revaluation profits from 
distributable profits. However, from May 2006, Japanese Company Act changed its 
distribution rule to include revaluation profits in distributable profits. Utilizing this 
institutional setting, I divided  the sample into two  periods (the  Commerce Law 
period  (2002−2005) and the  Company Act period (2006−2008)) to investigate the 
economic consequences of a change in the distribution rule. 
   Although revaluation profits from securities do not have a statistically significant 
positive correlation with dividends in the  Commerce Law period,  I found that 
revaluation profits have a significantly positive correlation with dividend payouts 
during the  Company Act period. On the other hand, revaluation losses have a 
significantly positive correlation with dividends throughout  all sample periods. 
These results indicate that,  in Japan,  revaluation profits from fair value 
measurements are distribution-relevant and the change in the distribution rule had 
an impact on companies’ dividend policies.   5 
 
   This research contributes to the literature on the economic consequences of fair 
value accounting. Brüggemann et al. [2010] points out that the literature on the 
“unintended” economic consequences of IFRS adoption or fair value accounting is 
still in its infancy. To appropriately evaluate the “value” of fair value accounting or 
IFRS, I believe that  it is important to examine the consequences  of fair value 
accounting from various perspectives. Moreover, I believe that this research will 
support the arguments for institutional designing. As  noted above, fair value 
accounting may affect the effectiveness of the  distribution rule, especially in a 
country where the distribution rule is based on a legal capital system. To the best of 
my knowledge, this  is the first empirical study  that focuses on the  relationship 
between fair value accounting and the distribution rule. 
   The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I provide an institutional 
and theoretical background for the relationship between dividends and earnings 
components, and develop hypotheses. In section three, I discuss the design of the 
research. The fourth section discusses the results of the analyses. In section five, I 
present the conclusion. 
 
2      Research background and hypothesis development 
In this section, I describe the background of this research. First, I describe 
Japanese accounting standards for financial instruments. Accounting for financial 
instruments is one of the major fair value accounting in Japan. Second, I describe the 
distribution rule in Japan. In particular, I focus on a change in the distribution rule 
with respect  to the treatment of revaluation profits from financial instruments. 
Third, I  describe previous literature  on earnings persistence and earnings 
components to develop hypotheses. 
 6 
 
2.1      Accounting for financial instruments in Japan 
   I analyze the  economic consequences  of fair value accounting by focusing on 
accounting for financial instruments. In Japan, fair value measurements for 
financial instruments have been  mandated since April 2001. According to 
“accounting standards  for financial instruments”  as  published by the  Business 
Accounting Deliberation Council in 1999, the evaluation of financial instruments 
depends on the purpose of the holding. Table1 summarizes the Japanese standards 
for financial securities.   
Insert Table 1 about here 
The  Japanese accounting standards mandate mark-to-market accounting for 
trading  securities and available-for-sale securities. Trading securities include 
changes in fair values reported in net income. In other words, the revaluation profits 
and losses from trading securities are included in the income statement. On the other 
hand, available-for-sale securities basically include  with changes in fair values 
reported in the net assets of the balance sheet. Thus, the revaluation profits and 
losses to be considered as earning components are basically from trading securities. 
 
2.2   The distribution rule in Japan 
   Japan has a distribution rule similar to the EU’s balance sheet test, and it is 
based on the legal capital system that requires firms to maintain certain amounts of 
legal capital. In this type of distribution rule, capital maintenance is considered to 
lead creditor protection because almost the same amounts of assets that are assumed 
to contribute to protect the interests of creditors are  maintained in companies. 
Therefore, distributable profits are the amounts of net assets after excluding legal 
capital, namely accumulated earnings on the balance sheet. 
   However, as pointed out in Kraakman et al. [2009], the effectiveness of the 7 
 
distribution rule is dependent on accounting standards. With regard to fair value 
accounting, many researchers have stated that paying out unrealized profits is an 
institutional matter (e.g., Pellens and Sellhorn, 2006; Ito, 1993; Saitou, 1991; 2009, 
etc). Because distributing unrealized profits means decreasing cash and increasing 
riskier assets  (namely,  unrealized incremental parts of assets  from fair value 
measurements), the  capital maintained through the distribution rule may not 
support  creditor protection. Therefore, as an institutional correspondence to fair 
value accounting, Japanese Commerce Law required  the deduction  of  any 
revaluation profits from distributable profits.   
   However, the Company Act and not the Commerce Law became effective in May 
2006. Therefore, the Japanese distribution rule changed the treatment of revaluation 
profits from trading securities. The new Company Act allowed the inclusion  of 
revaluation profits from trading securities in distributable profits. With respect to 
this institutional change, Aizawa and Koritani [2006], who were  officers of the 
Ministry of Justice at the time, stated that trading securities were equivalent to cash 
in terms of liquidity,  and thus  revaluation profits from trading securities were 
distributable. In other words, the Japanese Company Act began to recognize the 
revaluation profits from trading securities as “realized” profits  and, as a result, 
deemed revaluation profits from trading securities distributable as of May 2006. 
   In short, in Japan, although the Commerce Law did not treat revaluation profits 
from trading securities as  distributable,  they  became  distributable through  the 
Company Act. Such an institutional change provides a unique research setting for 
investigating the economic consequences of the distribution rule.   
 
2.3      Earnings components and dividends 
   As noted above, the central questions of this research are whether revaluation 8 
 
profits and losses are related to dividends and whether a change in the distribution 
rule influences companies’ dividend policies. To examine these questions, I focus on 
the relationship between earnings and dividends in the same way as Goncharov and 
van Triest [2011]. The formal link between earnings and dividends is proposed in the 
seminal work of Lintner [1956]. According to Lintner’s partial adjustment model, 
companies aim to pay out a certain percent of permanent or core earnings as 
dividends and slowly adjust their current payouts to the target ratio. This model 
implies that dividends (or changes in dividends) can be a function of current earnings 
and past dividends, and predicts that dividends are related to permanent earnings 
components and not to transitory components. 
   In this regard, numerous studies show that dividends are related to permanent 
earnings.  Edwards and Mayer [1985] shows that UK companies tend to reduce 
dividend payouts only when facing a persistent decline in earnings. Conversely, this 
implies that transitory components of earnings are not relevant to distributions. 
Kormendi and Zarowin [1996] finds that dividend payouts are higher in firms with 
more persistent earnings. Jagannathan et al. [2000] finds that only a proxy for a 
permanent income component significantly affects changes in dividends. Skinner 
[2004] reports that the reported earnings of companies paying dividends are more 
persistent in future periods. In Japan, there are also studies which support the link 
between earnings components and dividends. Hanaeda and Serita [2008], which 
reports  the  results of  a questionnaire survey of  Japanese companies, shows that 
about 80% of managers consider long-term changes in net income as important as 
determining dividend policies, while 44% of managers think that transitory changes 
in net income are  important. These results imply that, in Japan,  permanent 
components of earnings are more related to dividend policy  than transitory 
components. Yoshioka et al. [2008], which conducts a different questionnaire survey, 9 
 
reports that 22.4%  of companies replied  that  “distributing revaluation profits is 
reasonable,” while 68.9% of companies answered “not reasonable.” This may also 
imply that uncertain transitory components are not distribution-relevant. 
 
2.4   Hypotheses  development 
   Since fair values incorporate market expectations about future cash flows and 
reflect present economic conditions, mark-to-market accounting is expected to 
introduce additional transitory components in the income statement, which may 
increase the volatility of aggregate income (Barth et al., 2001; Hung and 
Subramanyam, 2007; Goncharov and van Triest, 2011). Prior literature suggests that 
dividends are not related to volatile earnings components (Jagannathan et al., 2000; 
Lintner, 1956). Conversely, as long as revaluation profits and losses from fair value 
accounting are persistent, these components should affect  dividend payouts. 
However, as revaluation profits and losses from securities stem  from market 
fluctuations  or transitory variations in stock prices, such  profits and losses are 
expected to be transitory earnings components. Thus,  I hypothesize here  that 
transitory revaluation profits and losses do not significantly affect changes in 
dividends. 
H1: Revaluation profits and losses have no effect on distribution. 
   In addition, according to the results of Hanaeda and Serita [2008] and Yoshioka et 
al. [2008], even if the  Japanese Company Act allows for the distribution of 
revaluation profits from trading securities, Japanese companies are expected not to 
pay out such profits. In other words, no matter how the distribution rule changes, 
revaluation profits and losses do not significantly affect dividends. This leads to my 
second hypothesis. 
H2: Even with a change in the distribution rule to include revaluation profits 10 
 
into distributable profits, revaluation profits and losses have no effect on 
distributions. 
   As Goncharov and van Triest [2011] points out, these hypotheses have underlying 
assumptions: revaluation profits and losses from fair value accounting are transitory, 
and relevant stakeholders (managers who propose dividends, and shareholders who 
approve them) assess the persistency of the revaluation profits and losses. In this 
respect, previous literature shows the opposite results. For example, DeAngelo et al. 
[1996] reports that dividends tend not to be reliable signals of future earnings and, 
managers tend to overestimate future earnings after long-term growth. Hirshleifer et 
al. [2004] provides empirical evidence showing that investors fail to correctly assess 
the persistence of earnings components. However, in this research I hypothesize that 
these assumptions are expected to be valid for a number of previous studies 
described in the preceding section. I also test the persistence of earnings components 
in a later section. 
 
3      Research design and sample selection 
3.1   Research design 
   To test the hypotheses, I regress dividend changes on revaluation profits and 
losses using Lintner’s partial adjustment model, as modified by Fama and Babiak 
[1968]. Equation (1) represents the first step of the regression model:   
              ∆𝐷𝐼𝑉i,t = 𝗼1 + 𝗽1𝐷𝐼𝑉i,t−1 + 𝗽2𝑁𝐼i,t + 𝗽3𝑁𝐼i,t−1 + 𝜀i,t     (1) 
where  ∆𝐷𝐼𝑉i,t  and  𝐷𝐼𝑉i,t−1  are dividend changes from year t-1 to year t and lagged 
dividends, respectively; 𝑁𝐼i,t  and  𝑁𝐼i,t−1  represent net income for  year  t  and  t-1, 
respectively. 
   In the next step, I decompose net income into net income before revaluation 
profits and losses from securities (proxy for permanent earnings;  𝑁𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑉i,t) and 11 
 
revaluation profits and losses from securities (proxy for transitory earnings;  𝑅𝐸𝑉i,t) : 
    ∆𝐷𝐼𝑉i,t = 𝗼1 + 𝗽1𝐷𝐼𝑉i,t−1 + 𝗽2𝑁𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑉i,t + 𝗽3𝑅𝐸𝑉i,t + 𝗽4𝑁𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑉i,t−1 + 𝜀i,t   (2) 
where all variables are as defined previously and are scaled by total assets. This is 
the same method adopted by Goncharov and van Triest [2011]. 
   However, there are two differences with Goncharv and van Triest [2011]. First, 
the Russian companies used by  Goncharov and van Triest [2011]  reported  only 
positive revaluation adjustments. In contrast to Russia, most Japanese companies 
posted negative revaluation adjustments, while only a few posted revaluation profits. 
Thus, to investigate the economic consequences of fair value accounting in Japan, it 
is necessary to focus on revaluation losses, and not only on revaluation profits. I 
incorporate dummy variables into equation (2) as cross-terms to separate revaluation 
profit samples from loss samples. Second, as  noted  in the previous section, the 
distribution rule  changed in Japan. In short, although revaluation profits from 
trading  securities were not distributable during the Commerce Law period, they 
became distributable during the Company Act period. To test H2, I divide the sample 
into two subsamples: the Commerce Law period (2002−2005) and the Company Act 
period (2006−2008). 
   The result of considering these differences is the final regression model used by 
this research, as in equation (3) below:     
          ∆𝐷𝐼𝑉i,t = 𝗼1 + 𝗽1𝑁𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑉i,t + 𝗽2𝑁𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑉i,t−1 + 𝗽3𝑅𝐸𝑉 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆i,t 
                         +𝗽4𝑅𝐸𝑉 ∗  𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑈𝑆i,t + 𝗽5𝐷𝐼𝑉i,t−1 + 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑠it 
                              +𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆it + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐸𝑆it + 𝜀i,t        (3) 
where  𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆i,t  and  𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑈𝑆i,t  are dummy variables  that equal  one if 
𝑅𝐸𝑉i,t  is positive and  0  otherwise, and that equal  one if 𝑅𝐸𝑉i,t  is negative and  0 
otherwise, respectively. In equation (3), if revaluation profits and losses significantly 
affect any dividend changes, 𝗽3  and  𝗽4  are expected to be significantly positive or 12 
 
negative. Thus, according to my hypotheses, I expect not to observe any significance 
in  𝗽3  and  𝗽4  .   
 
3.2      Sample selection, variables and descriptive statistics 
   I analyze a sample of public companies listed in Japan. The data is obtained from 
the Nikkei Digital Media, Inc. database called NIKKEI NEEDS Financial-Quests, 
which includes detailed financial data for a comprehensive set of Japanese public 
companies. The sample period spans from  2002 to 2008, since fair value 
measurements for financial instruments were mandated from 2001. I use firm-year 
observations with available annual accounting data of companies except for those in 
the banking, securities, and insurance sectors. The final sample consists of 25,684 
firm-year observations, in which there are 399 firm-year revaluation profit samples, 
13,890 firm-year revaluation loss samples, and 11,395  firm-year  non-revaluation 
samples. The variables used in equation (3) are listed below, and explained in Table 2 
in detail. 
        𝑁𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑉 = net income before revaluation pro�its and losses from securities.  
   𝑅𝐸𝑉 = revaluation pro�its and losses from securities. 
      𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆  = dummy variable which take 1 if 𝑅𝐸𝑉 is positive,otherwise 0. 
      𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑈𝑆  = dummy variable which take 1 if 𝑅𝐸𝑉 is negative,otherwise 0. 
      𝐷𝐼𝑉 = total amounts of dividends. 
      ∆𝐷𝐼𝑉 =  𝐷𝐼𝑉 changes from previous year.   
      𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 =  amounts of cash and the equivalent. 
   𝐿𝐸𝑉 =  total amounts of  debt.   
      𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 =  average growth rate of Sales for past 3 years.   
   𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 =  naturallog of total assets.   
      𝐹𝑆𝐻 =  proportion (percentage) of shares held by foregin investors.  13 
 
      𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴𝐼𝑁 =  total amounts of distributable pro�its or accumulated pro�its. 
      𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆 =  year dummies from 2002 to 2008. 
        𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐸𝑆 =  industry dummies,using Nikkei Middle Classi�ication. 1  
The first six variables are explained above, and the others are control variables. 
CASH, LEV, GROWTH and SIZE are also used in Goncharov and van Triest [2011] 
to control for the cross-sectional variation in dividend policy2
   Here, I add a note of caution on the variables REV. As noted in the previous 
section, I use revaluation profits and losses from securities on the income statements. 
Since these are aggregate numbers, it is impossible to distinguish which securities 
have positive or negative revaluation adjustments. With respect  to revaluation 
profits, it is natural to infer that they come from trading securities. However, it is 
impossible to state that this is true for revaluation losses because such figures might 
include amounts related to the impairment of securities or revaluation losses from 
. FSH is incorporated to 
control  for  shareholder structure. In Japan, an increase in  foreign investors  was 
observed after the 1990s, which presumably influences companies’ dividend policies 
(e.g., Nakao, 2008). RETAIN  is incorporated to control for  the size of firms’ 
distributable profits. Here, RETAIN is calculated separately for the Commerce Law 
period and the Company Act period. YEARS and INDUSTRIES are year dummy and 
industry dummy variables, respectively, to control for the differences in each sample 
year and each industry. All variables except for dummy variables, GROWTH, and 
FSH are scaled by total assets. Moreover, to rule out the impact of outliers, I used 
data at the  99th percentile and at the  1st  percentile to be the maximum and 
minimum, respectively, for each variable. 
                                                        
1  Nikkei Middle Classification classifies all Japanese listed companies into 36 industries. 
2  See Ross[1977], Bhattacharya[1979] and Fama and French[1998] for signaling hypothesis, see   
Grossman and Hart[1980], Easterbrook[1984], Jensen[1986] for free cash flow hypothesis, and 
see Grullon et al. [2002] and DeAngelo et al.[2006] for life-cycle hypothesis. 14 
 
other types of securities. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the test variables. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
4   Empirical  findings 
4.1   Dividend policy analysis 
   First, to test my first hypothesis, I use the estimating model (3) for all sample 
periods. The results of the estimating model (3) for the full sample are reported in 
Table 3. The second column of Table (3) shows the results using the REV variable, 
which substitutes both revaluation profits and losses (model (a)). The third column of 
Table 3 shows the results using cross-terms with respect to the REV variable. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
   Consistent with Lintner’s partial adjustment model, Table 3 reports a negative 
coefficient on lagged dividends and a positive coefficient on contemporaneous net 
income. However, as shown in Table 3, the coefficients  for  𝑅𝐸𝑉i,t , 
𝑅𝐸𝑉 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆i,t   and  𝑅𝐸𝑉 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑈𝑆i,t   are positive and statistically 
significant.  In particular, the  coefficients  for𝑅𝐸𝑉i,t  and  𝑅𝐸𝑉 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑈𝑆i,t  are 
significant at the 1% level. In other words, even after controlling for  persistent 
earnings and distributable profits, a  positive association between fair value 
adjustments and changes in dividends is observed, and thus the possibility exists 
that revaluation profits and losses have an impact on dividends. As a result, my first 
hypothesis, which predicts that  revaluation profits and losses have no effect on 
distribution, is rejected. 
   Next, to test my second hypothesis, I use estimating model (3) for two divided 
sample periods, the Commerce Law period (2002−2005) and the Company Act period 
(2006−2008). The results are reported in Table 4. 
Insert Table 4 about here 15 
 
The second and third columns show results for model (a), and the fourth and fifth 
columns  show results for model (b) for each the Commerce Law period and the 
Company Act period. Model (a) shows statistically significant positive coefficients on 
𝑅𝐸𝑉i,t   for both  periods. This implies that no matter how the  institutional 
environment changed, revaluation adjustments have an impact on changes  in 
dividends. However, focusing on model (b), the results seem to change. In  the 
Commerce Law period,  no statistically significant association  exists  between 
revaluation profits and changes in dividends, but a significantly positive association 
exists between them at the 10% level during the Company Act period. I believe this 
suggests that a portion of the companies decided their dividend policies in light of 
revaluation profits  as  the  distribution rule changed. In contrast, there is a 
significantly  positive association between revaluation losses and changes in 
dividends for both periods at the 1% level. As a result, my second hypothesis, which 
predicts that revaluation profits and losses have no effect on distribution for both the 
Commerce Law period and the Company Act period, is rejected. 
 
4.2   Earnings  persistence  test 
   My hypotheses are conditional on the persistence of earnings components. I 
assumed that revaluation profits and losses are transitory, and thus are assumed not 
associated  with dividends. However, from the  above regression  analyses,  positive 
associations between them were observed. This might suggest that the underlying 
assumption of my hypotheses was incorrect. Therefore, I conduct additional tests to 
assess the persistence of revaluation adjustments  using earnings  persistence 
regression, which was introduced in Goncharov and van Triest [2011] and is similar 
to that of Sloan [1996]. Equation (4) below is the regression model: 
         𝑁𝐼i,t = γ0 + γ1𝑁𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑉i,t−1 + γ2𝑅𝐸𝑉i,t−1 + ξi,t       (4) 16 
 
where the variables are defined above. The sign and the magnitude of  γ2  depend on 
the persistence of revaluation adjustments. If fair value adjustments are fully 
transitory, revaluation profits and losses do not explain future earnings, and thus  γ2 
is expected to be zero. If fair value adjustments convey some information about 
future earnings, they are considered persistent, thus, with respect to future earnings, 
γ2  should be greater than zero for good news (profits) and less than zero for bad news 
(losses). 
Insert Table 5 about here 
   The results of estimating model (4) are reported in Table 5. Here, I separately 
estimate the coefficients for a sample group of revaluation profits (second column) 
and a sample group of revaluation losses (third column). From Table 5, while the 
coefficient for  γ2  for revaluation profits is positive but not statistically significant, 
the coefficient for  γ2  for revaluation losses is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. These results imply that while revaluation profits from securities are 
transitory components of earnings, revaluation losses are persistent components. 
   Given these results, I have to reconsider the results from the previous regression 
analyses. In other words, my first hypothesis is half-supported and half-rejected. 
With  respect to revaluation losses, since they are considered  persistent earnings 
components, they have positive association with changes in dividends. However, with 
respect to revaluation profits, although they are considered transitory components of 
earnings, they have a significantly positive association with changes in dividends 
during the Company Act period. 
 
4.3   Additional  analysis 
   Why do revaluation profits, which are found to be transitory, have an impact on 
dividends  in Japan? Many previous studies imply that transitory earnings 17 
 
components do not have any distribution consequences. In this subsection, I conduct 
additional analysis to examine why revaluation profits are associated with changes 
in dividends. 
   Previous studies explain that financially distressed companies have incentives to 
manage accounting earnings to retain distributable profits. For example, Suda et 
al.[2007] explains that financially distressed companies have an incentive to 
continue to pay dividends  because they want to avoid signaling bad news about 
future earnings to the capital markets. Then, such companies attempt to manage 
accounting earnings to retain their dividend resources. If so, the possibility exists 
that financially distressed companies tend to post revaluation profits on income 
statements to retain dividend resources. 
   The Japanese accounting standard for securities allows for some discretion in 
managing accounting earnings. For example, managers can post revaluation profits 
on the income statements when they reclassify companies’ securities (see Table 1). In 
particular, when managers reclassify available-for-sale securities with positive fair 
value adjustments into trading securities, the revaluation profits are recognized and 
included in distributable profits. 
   Here, I examine whether  such earnings management  behavior exists  in 
financially distressed companies. To do so,  I  first  define “financially distressed” 
companies. Then, I compare their ratio of revaluation profits to distributable profits 
(namely,  REV/RETAIN) to “non-financially distressed” companies. If “financially 
distressed” companies exhibit greater  ratios  than  “non-financially distressed” 
companies, this implies that “financially distressed” companies may be managing 
accounting earnings. In addition, since the Company Act allows companies to include 
revaluation profits in distributable profits, I predict that companies tend to manage 
earnings during the Company Act period, not during the Commerce Law period. 18 
 
I use a discriminant model, SAF2002 which was introduced by Shirata [2003] to 
define “financially distressed” companies. The model is as follows : 
𝑆𝐴𝐹2002 = 0.01036𝑋1 + 0.02682𝑋2 − 0.06610𝑋3 − 0.02368𝑋4 + 0.070773 
where  𝑋1  is retained earnings divided by total capital (percentage), 𝑋2  is net 
income before taxes divided by total assets (percentage), 𝑋3  is inventory assets 
multiplied by 12 divided by sales, and 𝑋4   is interest costs divided by sales 
(percentage). In this model, the dicriminant point is 0.68. Therefore, if a company’s 
SAF2002 is smaller than 0.68, the company is defined as “financially distressed.” 
Also, a company whose SAF2002 is larger than 0.68 is defined as “non-financially 
distressed.” I apply this model to samples that pay dividends and have revaluation 
profits, for both the Commerce Law and the Company Act periods.   
Insert Table 6 about here 
Panel A of Table 6 shows mean and median values for REV/RETAIN for four 
groups. The group with the highest mean and median of REV/RETAIN contains the 
“financially distressed companies  in the Company Act period.”  This result is 
consistent with an ex ante prediction. Next, I test whether there are statistically 
significant differences among the four groups. Panel B of Table 6 reports the results 
of the Welch’s t−test and the Mann−Whitney’s U test. From Panel B, although no 
significant difference exists  between  “financially distressed”  companies  and 
“non-financially distressed”  companies in the Commerce Law period, there is a 
strong significant difference between “financially distressed”  companies and 
“non-financially distressed” companies in the Company Act period. Moreover, there is 
only a weak significant difference between the Commerce Law period  and  the 
Company Act period for “financially distressed” companies, where the latter has a 
larger REV/RETAIN than the former. 
These results imply that a change in the  distribution rule has given new 19 
 
incentives to financially distressed companies to retain distributable profits. In other 
words, a change in the distribution rule may create methods for generating dividend 
resources in financially distressed companies. This seems a self-contradiction of the 
Company Act, because a change in the distribution rule ― whose purpose is to protect 
companies’ creditor  ―  may encourage financially distressed companies to pay 
dividends. 
 
5   Conclusion 
   This research investigated the economic consequences of fair value accounting 
and a change in the distribution rule. The main questions addressed were whether 
revaluation profits and losses from fair value accounting are related to dividends, 
and whether a change in the distribution rule influences companies’ dividend policies. 
I analyzed  the relationship between fair value  adjustments and dividends using 
Lintner’s partial adjustment model. In addition, I hypothesized that if revaluation 
profits and losses are transitory, they have no effect on distribution, and a change in 
the distribution rule does not impact companies’ dividend policies. Next, I evaluated 
these hypotheses using a large sample of Japanese companies. The Japanese 
institutional setting provides a unique opportunity to assess the effects of fair value 
accounting and a change in the distribution rule because the distribution rule for 
revaluation profits from securities changed in 2006. 
   There are three main findings. First, a  statistically significant positive 
relationship between fair value adjustments and changes in dividends was observed. 
In particular, while revaluation profits have a  positive correlation with dividend 
changes at the 10% level, revaluation losses have a positive correlation at the 1% 
level. Second, while revaluation profits from securities were found to be transitory 
components of earnings, the losses were found to be persistent components. Thus, in 20 
 
Japan, positive fair value adjustments are positively related to changes in dividends, 
even if they are transitory. Third, from additional analysis, I found that financially 
distressed companies tended to have greater  REV/RETAIN  ratios than 
non-financially distressed companies during the Company Act period. This implies 
that if the  Company Act allows for the inclusion of  revaluation profits in 
distributable profits, financially distressed companies tend to make use of such an 
institutional setting to generate dividend resources. 
   These results indicate that the  introduction of fair value accounting affects 
distribution, and that a change in the distribution rule has economic consequences. 
In particular, the consequences of a  change of distribution rule may be helping 
financially distressed companies with their dividend policies. If so, this seems a 
self-contradiction of  the  Company Act,  whose  purpose is to protect companies’ 
creditors. 
   I contribute this research to the literature on the economic consequences of fair 
value accounting by evaluating the impact  of fair value on dividend policies. In 
addition, I contribute to the arguments about institutional designing or regulators 











Table 1: Summary of Japanese standard for securities 
  Classification of Securities 
Valuation 
Basis 
Procedure of Fair Value Adjustments 












Available-for-sale securities  Fair value 
1) Report on net assets in balance sheet. 
2) Report on net assets for positive fair 
value adjustments, and report on income 
statement for negative ones. 
















Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std dev  Q1  Median  Q3 
𝑁𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑉it  0.01764  0.07602  0.00738  0.02309  0.04577 
𝑁𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑉it−1  0.02151  0.06510  0.00807  0.02332  0.04589 
𝑁𝐼it  0.01162  0.08505  0.00462  0.02021  0.04316 
𝑁𝐼it−1  0.01642  0.07110  0.00509  0.02036  0.04348 
𝑅𝐸𝑉it  −0.00528  0.01632  −0.00286  −0.00009  0.00000 
𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆it  0.01553  0.12367  0  0  0 
𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑈𝑆it  0.54080  0.49834  0  1  1 
𝑅𝐸𝑉 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆it  0.00001  0.00010  0  0  0 
𝑅𝐸𝑉 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑈𝑆it  −0.00529  0.01631  −0.00286  −0.00009  0.00000 
𝐷𝐼𝑉it−1  0.00822  0.00836  0.00267  0.00651  0.01100 
∆𝐷𝐼𝑉it  0.00082  0.00418  0.00000  0.00000  0.00153 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻it  0.34453  0.19400  0.19882  0.32552  0.46968 
𝐿𝐸𝑉it  0.50848  0.22397  0.33583  0.51527  0.68178 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻it  1.06929  0.20799  0.98082  1.02682  1.09340 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸it  10.18671  1.59926  9.13176  10.06661  11.10701 
𝐹𝑆𝐻it  0.07278  0.10159  0.00308  0.02757  0.10334 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴𝐼𝑁it  0.20497  0.27578  0.07513  0.20237  0.36316 
Data sample represents 25,684 firm-year observations of public companies listed in Japan. 
Samples of revaluation profits include 399 firm-years, samples of revaluation losses include 
13,890 firm-years, and samples of no-revaluations include 11,395 firm-years.  𝑁𝐼it  (𝑁𝐼it−1) is 
net income in year t (t-1), while 𝑁𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑉it  (𝑁𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑉it−1) is net income before revaluation profits 
and losses in year (t-1).  𝑅𝐸𝑉it  is  fair value adjustments resulting from  revaluations of 
securities, namely revaluation profits and losses. 𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆it  (𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑈𝑆it) is an 
indicator variable equaling one if a company reports revaluation profits (losses) in year t and 
0 otherwise.  𝐷𝐼𝑉it−1  and  ∆𝐷𝐼𝑉it  are lagged dividends and changes in dividends, respectively. 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻it  is amounts of cash and equivalents at the end of the year, while  𝐿𝐸𝑉it  is total debt. 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻it  is the average growth rate of sales for the past three years, while 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸it  is the 
natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the year.  𝐹𝑆𝐻it  is the proportion of shares held 
by foreign investors, while 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴𝐼𝑁it  is distributable profits at the end of the year. All 




  Table 3: Dividend policy analysis (full sample periods) 
Variable  (a) only REV  (b) separate 
Constant 
0.002  0.002 
(6.078)***  (5.989)*** 
𝑁𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑉it 
0.018  0.018 
(43.706)***  (43.735)*** 
𝑁𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑉it−1 
0.001  0.001 















−0.067  −0.067 
(−18.914)***  (−18.945)*** 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻it 
0.001  0.001 
(9.328)***  (9.363)*** 
𝐿𝐸𝑉it 
−0.002  −0.002 
(−10.709)***  (−10.686)*** 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻it 
0.001  0.001 
(7.316)***  (7.326)*** 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸it 
0.000  0.000 
(−3.150)***  (−3.125)*** 
𝐹𝑆𝐻it 
0.000  0.000 
(15.571)***  (15.572)*** 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴𝐼𝑁it 
0.000  0.000 
(−5.547)***  (−5.591)*** 
N  25,684  25,684 
Adj.  R2  0.187  0.187 
*** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. In this 
regression model, I exclude 𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆it   and  𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑈𝑆it   because there are 
multicollinearities between the dummy variables and the  corresponding  cross-terms (the 















0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
(3.840)***  (2.913)***  (3.814)***  (2.840)*** 
𝑁𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑉it 
0.016  0.020  0.015  0.020 
(29.029)***  (31.763)***  (29.095)***  (31.798)*** 
𝑁𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑉it−1 
0.002  −0.001  0.002  −0.001 
(3.795)***  (−1.786)*  (3.802)**  (−1.761)* 
𝑅𝐸𝑉it 
0.011  0.012 
   
(4.270)***  (5.389)*** 
   
𝑅𝐸𝑉 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆it     
0.130  0.700 
   
(0.505)  (1.701)* 
𝑅𝐸𝑉 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑈𝑆it     
0.011  0.012 
   
(4.255)***  (5.332)*** 
𝐷𝐼𝑉it−1 
−0.021  −0.100  −0.021  −0.100 
(−4.348)***  (−18.965)***  (−4.360)***  (−18.985)*** 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻it 
0.001  0.002  0.001  0.002 
(6.108)***  (7.103)***  (6.116)***  (7.139)*** 
𝐿𝐸𝑉it 
−0.001  −0.002  −0.001  −0.002 
(−6.964)***  (−7.122)***  (−6.956)***  (−7.110)*** 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻it 
0.001  0.002  0.001  0.002 
(4.336)***  (8.003)***  (4.340)***  (8.005)*** 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸it 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
(−2.597)***  (−2.303)**  (−2.590)***  (−2.278)** 
𝐹𝑆𝐻it 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
(11.671)***  (10.987)***  (11.672)***  (10.983)*** 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴𝐼𝑁it 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
(−4.108)***  (−3.658)***  (−4.120)***  (−3.699)*** 
N  14,601  11,083  14,601  11,083 
Adj.  R2  0.143  0.226  0.143  0.226 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%  levels, respectively. In this 
regression model, I exclude 𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆it  and  𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷_𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑈𝑆it  because there are multicollinearities 











−0.017  0.002 
(−1.540)  (1.781) 
𝑁𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑉it−1 
0.775  0.547 
(9.756)***  (46.027)*** 
𝑅𝐸𝑉it−1 
13.517  0.839 
(1.054)  (20.228)*** 
N  381  11,037 
Adj.  R2  0.199  0.234 
 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%  levels, respectively. In this 
regression model, I use sample periods from 2003−2008, because this regression analysis 
needs lagged adjustments of fair value accounting, 𝑅𝐸𝑉it−1. Thus, numbers of samples are 
slightly smaller than the above analysis. All variables are defined above. With respect to the 
















Table 6: Additional analysis of financially distressed companies 











N  12  173 
Mean  -12.07%  0.74% 




N  13  80 
Mean  13.44%  1.33% 

















・Panel B : Tests of differences for four groups 
 
Welch’s t-test  Mann-Whitney’ s U-test 
“financially distressed / Commerce Law” and 





“financially distressed / Commerce Law” 





“not financially distressed / Commerce Law” 





“financially distressed / Company Act” and “not 






In Table 6, I use samples whose data are available to calculate SAF2002, also which pay 
dividends and have revaluation profits. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. I use Welch’s t-test and Mann-Whitney’s U-test to test 
the differences in REV/RETAIN for each means and medians, respectively. Here, in Panel A, 
the mean of “financially distressed/Commerce Law” is negative because of one sample whose 
REV/RETAIN is −1.46. Since this means that the sample may count on “unrealized profits” 
from securities to pay dividends, I include the outlier. The results described in Panel B have 
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